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THE "DO-NOT-CALL LIST"




The controversy surrounding the constitutional challenge to the
federal telemarketing "Do-Not-Call List" is a revealing parable of
modern American life. The questions of First Amendment policy and
doctrine posed by the challenge to the list are interesting in their own
right. The real interest lies, however, not in the doctrinal chess moves
themselves, but in the patterns of the larger match those moves
reveal.
The "Do-Not-Call List" is the popular nickname for a national
Registry maintained by two federal agencies, the Federal Trade Com-
mission ("FTC") and Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"),
permitting consumers to opt-in to place their phone numbers on a na-
tional list of consumers who do not wish to be called on telephones by
telemarketers. 1 Consumers can register their personal phone num-
bers for the list either by phone or online. Most commercial
telemarketers are prohibited from phoning consumers on the list, and
face severe penalties for violations. There is an exception provided for
telemarketers who have an "established business relationship" with
the consumer.2 The purpose of the list is to protect privacy, sheltering
consumers who opt-in from the hassle and intrusion of unwanted
phone calls. The list does not apply, however, to political or charitable
callers, 3 and thus discriminates in its operation based upon the mes-
sage and the messenger, a discrimination that places the program in
arguable tension with First Amendment principles.
t Dean and Allen Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2004) (FTC rule); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2)
(2004) (FCC rule).
2. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(i-ii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(9)(i-ii). The term
"telemarketing" refers to commercial sales calls made to induce purchases of goods or
services. The "established business relationship" exception allows businesses to call
customers with whom they have conducted a financial transaction or to whom they have
sold, rented, or leased goods or services within 18 months of the telephone call. 47
C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(3).
3. 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B), 310.6(a); 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(c)(2),
64.1200(f)(9).
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When a federal district judge in Denver struck down the Do-Not-
Call List,4 finding that the discrimination it visited against commer-
cial telemarketers was a violation of the First Amendment, the deci-
sion torched an enormous political firestorm.5 One might have
thought the judge had struck down Social Security, Medicaid, Medi-
care, the Oscars, the Super Bowl, and the World Series in one fell
swoop. With exceptional speed, Congress geared up to fight the
court's decision, 6 and the world of radio and television talk shows were
ablaze with protest.7 The fire was put out, however, when the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the District
court, upholding the Do-Not-Call List and rejecting the First Amend-
ment challenge in Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Commission.8 In October of 2004, the United States Supreme
Court declined review.9
We are in the midst of a new struggle to find an appropriate place
for the legal protection of privacy in American life. The quest for the
recapture of privacy is the civil rights struggle of this new century.
Balancing the protection of privacy against other compelling social in-
terests, such as national security or freedom of speech, will be one of
the profound challenges to our legal system in the coming decade. In
recent times, privacy has not usually fared well in legal and political
face-offs with other social values. In the "Do-Not-Call" list story, how-
ever, privacy won. The victory may be an important portent of a shift
in national mood; a harbinger of future triumphs.1 0
4. Mainstream Mktg. Serv., Inc., v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 283 F.Supp.2d 1151 (D.
Colo. 2003).
5. Caroline E. Mayer, Do-Not-Call List Blocked Court; FTC Overstepped Role,
Judge Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2003, at Al.
6. A prior judicial setback to Do-Not-Call was a decision on September 23, 2003 by
the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. U.S. Sec. v. Fed.
Trade Comm'n, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (W.D. Okla. 2003). In U.S. Security, the district
court held that the FTC lacked the statutory authority to create its national Registry.
Whereas Congress had clearly given the FCC the green light to adopt a national Regis-
try enacting the TCPA, the district court reasoned that no similar explicit authority
existed under the TCFAP granting parallel authority to the FTC. Id. at 1291. In reach-
ing this judgment, the District Court was unmoved by the fact that the Implementation
Act appeared to tacitly endorse the FTC's national Registry, holding that Congress' ap-
propriation and fee-authorizing legislation was not a "ratification" of the FTC's actions
sufficient to constitute statutory authorization for the Registry. Id. at 1292. Congress
reacted with extraordinary swiftness to cure the alleged defect relied upon by the dis-
trict court in U.S. Security. Within days of the decision, Congress passed, and President
Bush signed into law, a statute explicitly and unequivocally granting the FTC authority
to enforce the Do-Not-Call Registry.
7. Dan Gorenstein, Court Ruling Shelves State's Do Not Call List (NH Public Ra-
dio news broadcast, Sept. 26, 2003)
8. 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 47 (October 4, 2004).
9. Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. F.T.C., 125 S.Ct. 47 (2004).
10. The decision of the Tenth Circuit in Mainstream Marketing was thus consistent
with other decisions in recent years approving similar telecommunications regulations.
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II. THE BACKGROUND STORY: CONGRESS,
TELEMARKETERS, THE FTC AND FCC
Congress passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") in 1991.11 The law was enacted "to protect residential tele-
phone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid telephone solicitations to
which they object."12 The FCC was directed to promulgate regula-
tions that restricted the use of automatic telephone dialing systems.
13
In 1992, the FCC adopted rules pursuant to the TCPA, but declined to
create a national "Do-Not-Call" list. Instead, the new rules required
telemarketers to adopt company-specific Do-Not-Call lists. Under this
system, a consumer who did not wish to receive telephone solicitations
from a particular company could request that the telemarketer re-
move that consumer's telephone number from the telemarketer's list.
By 2002, however, the FCC appeared to realize that its company-spe-
cific approach had failed to provide adequate privacy protection to con-
sumers, and the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
requesting comment on whether the Commission should revisit its de-
cision regarding the establishment of a national Do-Not-Call
Registry.
14
Three years after the enactment of the TCPA, Congress in 1994
enacted a second important piece of legislation, the Telemarketing
and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act ("TCFAP"). 15 The
law instructed the Commission to promulgate rules prohibiting decep-
tive and other abusive telemarketing acts or practices and to include
in such rules a definition of deceptive telemarketing acts or prac-
tices. 16 The TCFAP, enforced by the FTC, did not apply to activities
that were outside of the jurisdiction of the FTC, such as certain finan-
cial institutions, common carriers, air carriers and nonprofit organiza-
tions, or insurance companies. In 1995, the FTC adopted rules
See Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 652, 660 (8th Cir.2003) (upholding
regulations prohibiting unsolicited commercial fax advertising); Destination Ventures,
Ltd., v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir.1995) (same); Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970, 972-75
(9th Cir.1995) (upholding ban on prerecorded commercial telemarketing).
11. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1991).
12. Id. § 227(c)(1).
13. Id. § 227(b)(1).
14. The company-specific Do-Not-Call regulations required that a company must
respect a consumer's request not to receive calls from or on behalf of that particular
business. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A) (1992); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3) (1992).
There was evidence that as to commercial callers, the company-specific program had not
been effective. Mainstream Marketing, 358 F.3d at 1233 ("Itlhe government also had
evidence that the less restrictive company-specific do-not-call list did not solve the
problems caused by commercial telemarketing, but it had no comparable evidence with
respect to charitable and political fundraising").
15. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6101-6108 (1994) (-TCFAP-).
16. Id. § 6102(a) (1), (2).
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implementing this legislation, rules that did not contain any national
Do-Not-Call Registry.
By 2002, however, the FCC appeared to realize that its company-
specific approach had failed to provide adequate privacy protection to
consumers, and the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing requesting comment on whether the Commission should revisit its
decision regarding the establishment of a national do-not-call list. In
January 2002, the FTC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that
recommended the creation of a national Do-Not-Call Registry, to be
maintained by the FTC, as well as rules that addressed the problem of
"abandoned calls" resulting from the use of predictive dialers by
telemarketers. In January 2003, the FTC promulgated final rules es-
tablishing a nationwide Do-Not-Call Registry and specified require-
ments for the use of "predictive dialers." The FTC decided that the
previous company-specific Do-Not-Call rules, which permitted a con-
sumer to request that his name be removed from a company's call list,
were insufficient to protect consumers from unwanted calls. The FTC
found that telemarketers interfered with consumers' attempts to be
placed on company-specific lists by hanging up on them or ignoring
their request. The FTC noted that the prior practice placed too much
burden on consumers who had to repeat their Do-Not-Call request
with every telemarketer who called, that the company-specific list con-
tinually exposed consumers to unwanted initial calls which had signif-
icantly increased in numbers since adoption of the original FTC rules,
and that consumers had no method to verify that their name had been
removed from the company's list. Congress strongly supported these
efforts. 17
The FTC exempted charitable organizations from the do-not-call
requirements. The FTC made this exception partly in deference to the
heightened First Amendment protection afforded charitable speech.
The FTC also found that abusive telemarketing practices of the sort
the Registry sought to combat were more likely to be undertaken by
commercial telemarketers than those soliciting charitable and politi-
cal contributions. The FCC followed suit, ultimately adopting rules
that paralleled those of the FTC.
Congress strongly endorsed this movement in 2003, enacting the
Do-Not-Call Implementation Act. i8 The Implementation Act pro-
vided, among other things, that the FTC could promulgate regulations
17. Among other steps, Congress has directed the FCC to coordinate its efforts
with the FTC in order to maximize consistency between the agencies' do-not-call regula-
tions. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub.L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 (2003).
18. Id.
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establishing fees sufficient to implement and enforce the provisions of
its national Do-Not-Call Registry. 19
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO DO-NOT-CALL
A. THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
The Do-Not-Call Registry poses a conflict between two sacred
American values, both of constitutional dimension, the right of privacy
and freedom of speech. Privacy may be the most important emerging
right of this new century. As new technologies make it increasingly
difficult for Americans to maintain their privacy, evolution in admin-
istrative, statutory, and constitutional law is necessary to keep pace,
preserving privacy as an essential element of human dignity. Just as
we make adjustments for inflation in cost-of-living indexes, we may
need to think of "escalation clauses" in our legal protection for privacy.
As the ability of the outside world to impinge on individual privacy
increases, legal principles must escalate to meet the challenge, pre-
serving the power of the average person to fight back against unwel-
come intrusions.
20
How significant are the privacy interests implicated by
telemarketing? One might dismiss the privacy interests as relatively
trivial. The consumer, after all, may simply hang up. It is plain, how-
ever, that to a large number of Americans, the privacy intrusions
posed by telemarketing were deemed substantial. Over 50 million
Americans signed up with the Do-Not-Call list within the first few
months of its existence-roughly the number of voters who vote in a
typical American presidential election.2 1 Uninvited telephone solici-
tations are highly intrusive, particularly when they come during fam-
ily time such as dinner and early evenings in the home.
In turn, the privacy of the home has always been at the core of
English and American conceptions of privacy. The sacredness of the
home as a "castle," a fortress of privacy surrounded with moats of con-
stitutional and common-law protection, is legendary and centuries
old.2 2 William Pitt, in a speech before Parliament, declared the home
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches extended to cover elec-
tronic eavesdropping, even though the framers of the Constitution could not have con-
templated such an electronic search, because the Fourth Amendment was intended to
protect "people, not places").
21. Mainstream Marketing, 358 F.3d at 1234 ("So far, consumers have registered
more than 50 million phone numbers on the national do-not-call Registry.").
22. See Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604) ("the house of every one
is to him as his castle and fortress"); WILLIAM CUDDIHY & B. CARMON HARDY, A MAN'S
HOUSE WAs NOT His CASTLE: ORIGINS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, 37, 400 (1980) (noting that the belief that "a man's house is his
2005]
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
a sanctuary against the force of government, demarking the line at
which the brute power of the state must yield to the principle of pri-
vacy: "The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the
forces of the crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may
blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the king
of England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of
the ruined tenement."
23
This tradition was the backdrop of the Fourth Amendment, and
its guarantee of the right of the people to be secure in their "persons,
houses, papers, and effects" against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 24 This solicitude for the home, originally conceptualized as a
bulwark against the force of the state, has evolved into a broader con-
cept, in which the home is seen as an essential to one's autonomy and
privacy, a place of respite from the cruel world. In the words of Judge
Jerome Frank: "A man can still control a small part of his environ-
ment, his house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the
knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the Consti-
tution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty-worth protecting from
encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some
such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclo-
sure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's castle."2 5
Indeed, in a decision with many parallels to the Do-Not-Call Reg-
istry, decided in a simpler time in our history and dealing with old-
fashioned land mail, the Supreme Court acknowledged the right of the
consumer to reject unwanted mail. In Rowan v. United States Post
Office Department,2 6 the Court upheld a statute that allowed an ad-
dressee to refuse mail from any sender of "erotically arousing or sexu-
ally provocative" material by notifying the local postmaster, who then
instructed the sender to remove the addressee's name and address
castle" is found as an expression at least as early as the sixteenth century in English
jurisprudence).
23. See CUDDIHY & HARDY, supra note 22, at 386 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 299, n.3 (1868)); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIEs 223 (photo. reprint 1967) (1769) ("And the law of England has so particular
and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it stiles it his castle, and will
never suffer it to be violated with impunity .... For this reason no doors can in general
be broken open to execute any civil process; though, in criminal cases, the public safety
supersedes the private").
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961) ("[t]he Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long
history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion") (citing Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886)); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials
1029, 1065 (C.P. 1765).
25. United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J.,
dissenting).
26. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
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from its mailing list under penalty of law. Noting that the purpose of
the statute was to eliminate governmental involvement in any deter-
mination concerning the content of the materials, allowing the ad-
dressee complete and unfettered discretion in electing what speech he
or she desired to receive, the Court sustained the law. The First
Amendment right to speak, the Court reasoned, was only circum-
scribed by the addressee's affirmative act in giving notice that he or
she no longer wished to receive mail from the sender. Most impor-
tantly, the Court categorically rejected the argument that a vendor
has the right to send unwanted material into the home of another.
The court in Mainstream Marketing agreed with this rationale
when it held that restrictions on speech determined by the individual
are less onerous than those determined by the government. 2 7 Privacy
interests are also upheld when consumers concerned with the possibil-
ity of telephone fraud are able to deny unsavory commercial callers
the chance to victimize them. 28 Considering that consumers were los-
ing 40 billion dollars a year to fraudulent telemarketing before the
implementation of Do-Not-Call, this ability is extremely useful. 29
1. Protection of Commercial Speech
The vital privacy interests that animate the Do-Not-Call Registry
must be balanced against the competing First Amendment protection
for freedom of speech, a protection that often is dependent upon the
ability of the speaker to initiate the message, making a preliminary
attempt to engage the listener or reader, even though the message
may not have been invited.
Commercial telemarketing is a form of "commercial speech." Con-
temporary commercial speech doctrine is governed by a four-part test
first articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission,30 where the Court stated:
[Alt the outset, we must determine whether the expres-
sion is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial
speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both in-
quiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
27. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1242.
28. Id. at 1243.
29. Id. at 1235.
30. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
20051
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asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest.
3 1
The arc of modern commercial speech jurisprudence is unmistak-
able: in decision after decision, the Supreme Court has advanced pro-
tection for advertising, repeatedly striking down regulations grounded
in paternalistic motivations.
3 2
2. Content-Based Distinctions and the Charitable Speech Exception
General First Amendment doctrine outside the commercial
speech arena strongly condemns discriminating against speech on the
basis of its content or viewpoint.33 This non-discrimination principle
is not entirely invisible in the context of commercial speech. Perhaps
the single most important commercial speech case evidencing sensitiv-
ity to the non-discrimination principle is Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
31. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
32. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 364 (2002) (striking
down restrictions on pharmaceutical advertising); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 554-55 (2001) (striking down some and sustaining some restrictions on to-
bacco advertising); Greater New Orleans Inc., v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999)
(striking down casino gambling advertising limitations); 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down liquor advertisement restrictions); Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (striking down beer advertising regulations);
Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. and Prof. Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 147 (1994) (striking down
restrictions on accountancy advertising); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (strik-
ing down commercial speech limitations on accountants); Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (striking down restrictions on news racks for commercial
flyers and publications); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Illi-
nois, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (regulation banning lawyer advertisement of certification by
the Nat'l Bd. of Trial Advocacy as misleading unconstitutional); Shapero v. Ky. Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (regulation banning solicitation for legal business mailed on
a personalized or targeted basis to prevent potential clients from feeling undue duress
to hire the attorney unconstitutional); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (striking down some and upholding some
restrictions on lawyer advertising); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Product Corp., 463 U.S. 60
(1983) (statute banning unsolicited mailings advertising contraceptives to aid parental
authority over teaching their children about birth control unconstitutional); In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (regulations limiting the precise names of practice areas
lawyers can use in ads and identifying the jurisdictions lawyer is licensed in as mislead-
ingly unconstitutional); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elect. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980) (striking down restrictions on advertising statements by public utili-
ties); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (striking down restrictions on solicitation of
legal business on behalf of ACLU); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(regulation banning lawyer advertisement of prices for routine legal services as mis-
leadingly unconstitutional); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977);
(regulation banning placement of "for sale" signs in the front lawns of houses in order to
prevent the town from losing its integrated racial status unconstitutional); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (striking
down restrictions on pharmaceutical advertising); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975) (striking down restrictions on abortion advertising).
33. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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work, Inc.3 4 In Discovery Network, the Supreme Court struck down
an ordinance that engaged in content-based distinctions similar to
those in the Do-Not-Call Registry. In this case, the city of Cincinnati
enacted an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercial hand-
bills on public property. The ordinance effectively granted distribu-
tors of traditional "newspapers," such as the Cincinnati Post, USA
Today, or The Wall Street Journal, access to public sidewalks through
news racks, while denying equivalent news rack access to the distribu-
tors of commercial magazines and handbills, such as publications for
apartment or house rentals or sales. The ordinance was designed to
reduce the visual and spatial clutter of news racks. The constitutional
difficulty, however, was that no principled distinction could be drawn
between the clutter caused by a USA Today news rack and one caused
by a real estate magazine. Clutter was clutter, a news rack was a
news rack, and the content of the speech inside the rack bore no rela-
tion to the city's environmental or aesthetic interests. Indeed, the or-
dinance was applicable only to roughly 3% of the racks in the city,
those containing commercial magazines and handbills, while exempt-
ing racks holding traditional newspapers. The Supreme Court struck
down this content-discrimination, as it should have, for there was ab-
solutely no relationship between the traffic or aesthetic harms caused
by racks and the content of the material inside them. The Supreme
Court pointedly rejected the notion that government could simply
"pick on" commercial speech, making such speech bear a dispropor-
tionate burden, merely because the Central Hudson test contemplates
somewhat reduced constitutional protection for commercial speech.
The harm the government sought to address simply had nothing to do
with the commercial or non-commercial character of the speech that
was regulated.
3 5
The First Amendment principles forbidding content-discrimina-
tion, and the specific commercial speech principles that forbid discrim-
inating against commercial speech on grounds that are unrelated to
the commercial content of the speech, are well-entrenched and lauda-
ble components of our current constitutional jurisprudence. There are
sound reasons why courts look with great skepticism at content-based
distinctions, and sound reasons why these principles apply to adver-
tising and commercial speech. There is probably no principle more
central to our First Amendment tradition than the notion that the
government ought not to "pick and choose" among messages, particu-
larly when the values it seeks to vindicate bear no demonstrable rela-
tionship to the content of those messages.
34. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
35. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 435 (1993).
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The District Court in Mainstream Marketing applied this reason-
ing to strike down Do-Not-Call.3 6 An unwanted telephone call during
dinner is an unwanted telephone call during dinner. An abusive or
overbearing or fraudulent call is an abusive or overbearing or fraudu-
lent call. Whether the caller is a commercial vendor, a solicitor for a
charity, or a political fundraiser, the essential hit on privacy interests
remains the same. Similarly, the District Court could find nothing in
the record before it to support the supposition that commercial
telemarketers as a class are more prone to abuse or fraudulent prac-
tices than non-commercial telemarketers.
37
Following the straightforward logic of Discovery Network, the Dis-
trict Court thus struck down the Do-Not-Call Registry.38 The District
Court in Mainstream Marketing did not hold that any form of do-not-
call Registry would be unconstitutional. Indeed, the District Court ex-
plicitly acknowledged that the protection of privacy was a substantial
government interest sufficient to satisfy the second prong of Central
Hudson, and also acknowledged that the Registry directly and materi-
ally advanced that interest, satisfying the third prong of the test.
Rather, the District Court rested its decision on a non-discrimination
principle that cuts across many First Amendment areas, a principle
that generally looks with great skepticism at content-based distinc-
tions. The District Court distinguished Rowan largely on the ground
that, in Rowan, Congress left to the addressee the power to make the
content judgments to block mail from senders.
3 9
3. Reconciling Privacy and Speech-Striking the Proper Balance
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed
the District Court and upheld the constitutionality of the Do-Not-Call
List in Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion.40 The Tenth Circuit got it right.
4 1
36. Mainstream Mktg. Serv., Inc., v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 283 F. Supp.2d 1151 (D.
Colo. 2003).
37. Mainstream Mktg., 283 F. Supp.2d at 1167.
38. Id. at 1168.
39. The court further acknowledged:
Were the Do-Not-Call Registry to apply without regard to the content of the
speech, or to leave autonomy in the hands of the individual, as in Rowan, it
might be a different matter. As the amended Rules are currently formulated,
however, the FTC has chosen to entangle itself too much in the consumer's
decision by manipulating consumer choice and favoring speech by charitable
over commercial speech. The First Amendment prohibits the government from
enacting laws creating a preference for certain types of speech based on con-
tent, without asserting a valid interest, premised on content, to justify its dis-
crimination. Because the Do-Not-Call Registry distinguishes between the
indistinct, it is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Id. at 1168
40. 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 47 (2004)
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In one sense, the tension between privacy and speech posed by
Do-Not-Call may be distilled in the tension between the ruling in
Rowan and the ruling in Discovery Network. Who has the better of the
constitutional trumps? For a number of reasons, the anti-discrimina-
tion speech principle of Discovery Network ought not to be deemed
enough to offset the privacy principle of Rowan.
First, there was content discrimination in Rowan itself-the law
in Rowan was limited to sexually explicit advertising material that
would normally have been protected by the First Amendment. Yet the
Supreme Court in Rowan held that the free speech protection afforded
the material stopped at the mailbox. Second, in Discovery Network it
was the government acting as the direct discriminator. The govern-
ment banned the commercial news racks, interfering with communi-
cation between otherwise willing publishers and readers. With Do-
Not-Call, however, the government is not the active censor. The law
empowers the private citizen to bar certain speech from penetrating
the integument of the home, but sovereignty over the decision rests
with the consumer, not any government official. This renders Do-Not-
Call similar to Rowan, and different from Discovery Network. Third,
viewed both quantitatively and qualitatively, the connection between
the governmental interests vindicated by Do-Not-Call and the regula-
tory mechanism employed by the current FTC and FCC regulations is
direct, material, and reasonably tailored.4 2 Employing the sort of
analysis invited by Central Hudson, Do-Not-Call is easily defensible
as a government response to invasion of privacy. This stands in stark
contrast to the regulation in Discovery Network, in which there was a
complete "disconnect" between the object of the government regula-
tion-reduction of physical and visual clutter-and the ban on com-
mercial kiosks.
41. In a subsidiary holding, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the First Amendment was
not violated by a provision of Do-Not-Call that requires telemarketers to pay a modest
fee to obtain the phone numbers of consumers who have signed up for the national do-
not-call Registry. Id. at 1247-48. As the court noted, it is well-established that the First
Amendment protects against the imposition of charges, such as a license taxes, for the
enjoyment of free speech rights. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113-14
(1943). However, the government is allowed to exact a fee in order to offset the cost of
genuine regulations, even though such a fee could have an incidental burden on speech.
Id. at 114 n. 8; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941) (upholding license fees
of up to $300 to take part in a parade or procession because the fee was held "to be not a
revenue tax, but one to meet the expense incident to the administration of the act and to
the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed"); American Target Adver., Inc.
v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1246, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding Utah law that re-
quired charitable fundraisers to register with the state and pay $250 for a permit-
because that fee offsets increased regulatory costs associated with the act).
42. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238.
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The protection of the privacy of the home is plainly a "substantial"
governmental interest, and Do-Not-Call, by eliminating between 40%
and 60% of telemarketing calls, is manifestly a program that will di-
rectly and materially advance that interest. Moreover, the final prong
of Central Hudson, the requirement that there be a "reasonable fit"
between ends and means, is simply a demand of proportionality, not a
requirement of a "perfect" or even "best" fit.4 3 The First Amendment's
commercial speech jurisprudence does not normally require "all or
nothing." Rather, "[w]ithin the bounds of the general protection pro-
vided by the Constitution to commercial speech, we allow room for leg-
islative judgments." 4 As the history of Do-Not-Call demonstrates,
the Congress, the FCC, and the FTC evolved in their collective legisla-
tive and administrative judgments. The initial attempts to protect
privacy through the company-specific Do-Not-Call did not accomplish
the desired privacy objective. When the new option of a national Do-
Not-Call Registry was introduced, Americans responded in droves,
with over 50 million persons putting themselves on the Registry.
While First Amendment cases are not decided by plebiscite, the tidal
dimension of this overwhelming public response does speak with great
probity to the strength of the governmental interests serviced by Do-
Not-Call, and to the degree of pent-up public frustration and dissatis-
faction with prior attempts to limit the invasions of privacy caused by
telemarketing. Moreover, while the Do-Not-Call Registry empowered
consumers to block unwanted phone solicitations, the Registry had no
impact on the ability of advertisers to reach consumers through other
media.
4 5
Significantly, there was content-based regulation in Rowan. In-
deed, if anything, the content discrimination was more pointed in
Rowan than here. Rowan, remember, involved a restriction on adver-
tising limited to one narrow band of speech-the federal statute at
issue applied to advertisements that offered for sale matter which the
addressee in his sole discretion believed to be "erotically arousing or
sexually provocative."46
43. See Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989); United States v. Edge Broad. Co, 509 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1993). Fundamental to
these concepts is the notion that government may attack difficult problems through in-
cremental steps.
44. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 434. The First Amendment simply does not require
"that the Government make progress on every front before it can make progress on any
front."
45. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[tlhe challenged regula-
tions do not hinder any business' ability to contact consumers by other means, such as
through direct mailings or other forms of advertising").
46. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 730 (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) (1964
ed., Supp. IV)).
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Thus, while the Do-Not-Call Registry applies to all telemarketing,
the postal law in Rowan singled out a subset of advertising, dealing
with erotic material. The existence of this content-discrimination in
Rowan is enormously important, for when one focuses on it, the driv-
ing principles animating the decision in Rowan are far more brightly
illuminated. Those principles were privacy and consumer choice. The
confluence of those two values powered the engine in Rowan. Rowan
makes sense only in light of the combination of Rowan's reference for
the privacy within the home and the fact that the consumer, not the
government, made the ultimate blocking decision. Indeed, any other
explanation of Rowan would be incoherent, then and now.
For Rowan, it must be remembered, did not involve "obscene"
speech, which of course would have been entitled to no constitutional
protection whatsoever and could have been banned outright from the
mail. 47 Rather, this was sexually explicit but not obscene speech, ex-
pression that was within the protection of the First Amendment. Both
at the time Rowan was decided and today, it would have been plainly
unconstitutional for the government to ban by its own fiat the trans-
port of such sexually explicit (but not obscene) material through the
mails or the channels of interstate commerce.48 Thus, the only factors
that plausibly explain Rowan were the fact that the statute was en-
acted to reinforce the sovereignty of individuals to shut off the entry of
the advertising into the home, and the fact that it was the consumer,
not the government, who operated the shut-off valve.
How then, does Rowan fare when placed head-to-head with Dis-
covery Network? The principle of Discovery Network is logical and im-
portant as far as it goes. Nevertheless, it only goes so far. In
Discovery Network, the government did the censoring. It was the gov-
ernment in Discovery Network that banned the commercial news
racks. The government directly intervened in the marketplace of
ideas, frustrating an otherwise willing publisher from reaching an
otherwise willing reader. And this intervention by the government
took place in the open spaces of city streets and sidewalks, quintessen-
tial public fora traditionally open to the free flow of public discourse,
commercial and non-commercial alike. Under the Do-Not-Call re-
gime, however, no consumer willing to receive a message is prevented
from receiving one, and no messages are blocked by anyone in the
open arenas of public discourse and commercial marketing. As the
47. At the time Rowan was decided, obscenity was not protected under the First
Amendment. The leading case was Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The
basic principle that the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech remains good
law, though the test for obscenity first set forth in Roth was modified slightly by the
subsequent decision in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
48. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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Tenth Circuit found in 2004, the only decision-maker who can block a
message is the consumer, and the consumer may block the message
only at the threshold of the home.
4 9
These distinctions vacuum the oxygen from the First Amendment
assault on Do-Not-Call. The central First Amendment antipathy to-
ward content-discrimination by government, an antipathy that has al-
ways been driven primarily by a fear that government will censor
messages that it finds offensive or disagreeable, simply is not impli-
cated. Once again, a comparison to Rowan is pivotal. For the attack
on Do-Not-Call to hold water, it must treat Rowan as essentially over-
ruled by Discovery Network. If under Discovery Network distinctions
between commercial and non-commercial speech are not permissible,
let alone distinctions within the universe of commercial speech such
as those in Rowan, then the statute in Rowan would necessarily be
unconstitutional were that case to come before the Supreme Court in a
post-Discovery Network world. Not only is there nothing in Discovery
Network to indicate that anything so radical was intended, but as pre-
viously explained, even without Discovery Network the discrimination
that existed in Rowan would have been plainly unconstitutional if it
had been a government official (such as the Postmaster General) who
had been empowered to block the mail to consumers. Rowan, how-
ever, established the hierarchy of constitutional trumps. Privacy and
consumer choice trump freedom of speech when it is the consumer and
not the government controlling what speech enters the home and
what speech does not.
It is also exceedingly important that the Do-Not-Call List does not
partake of the paternalism that has been such a red flag in commer-
cial speech cases in which government regulations have been found to
violate the First Amendment. 50 In all of these cases, it was the gov-
ernment acting as censor, the government deciding that it new better
49. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1245.
50. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 364 (2002) (striking
down restrictions on pharmaceutical advertising); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 554-555 (2001) (striking down some and sustaining some restrictions on to-
bacco advertising); Greater New Orleans Inc., v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999)
(striking down casino gambling advertising limitations); 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down liquor advertisement restrictions); Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (striking down beer advertising regulations);
Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. and Prof. Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 147 (1994) (striking
down restrictions on accountancy advertising); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993)
(striking down commercial speech limitations on accountants); Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (striking down restrictions on
advertising statements by public utilities); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (striking
down restrictions on solicitation of legal business on behalf ofACLU); Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (regulation banning lawyer advertisement of prices for
routine legal services as misleadingly unconstitutional).
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than consumers what was good for them. This is the kind of over-
regulation of the free marketplace that acts as a drag on the economy,
and the kind of over-regulation of the marketplace of ideas that acts
as a drag on the free flow of commercial information protected by the
First Amendment.
Do-Not-Call does not fit this picture. Do-Not-Call does not place
the government in the censor seat. Do-Not-Call is not about paternal-
ism, but privacy, and that difference changes the constitutional
calculus.5 1 Do-Not-Call is not a paternalistic usurping of consumer
choice; it is an empowerment of consumer choice, in aid of the tranquil-
ity of the home. 52 Just as the traditional law of trespass empowers
the home dweller to bar an unwanted physical visitor, Do-Not-Call
empowers the home dweller to bar an unwanted electronic visitor. As
the Supreme Court noted in Rowan, the law has long recognized "the
right of a householder to bar, by order or notice, solicitors, hawkers,
and peddlers from his property."53 "The ancient concept that 'a man's
home is his castle' into which 'not even the king may enter' has lost
none of its vitality."
54
With Do-Not-Call, government is not paternalistically skewing
the marketplace of ideas. With Do-Not-Call, consumers are sovereign.
With Do-Not-Call, the government is simply reinforcing the ancient
shelter the law has provided for privacy within the home, vindicating
the ancient wisdom that the home is one's castle. The Registry is the
electronic equivalent of placing a "No Solicitation" sign in front of that
castle. 5 5 Viewed both quantitatively and qualitatively, the justifica-
tion for the distinctions drawn in Discovery Network were far weaker
than the justifications for the distinctions drawn in Do-Not-Call. In
the traditional parlance of Central Hudson and commercial speech
doctrine, the "fit" between ends and means, almost non-existent in
Discovery Network, is plainly "reasonable" for Do-Not-Call.
In Discovery Network, there was absolutely no relationship be-
tween the content of the material inside the news rack and the capac-
ity of the news rack to pose a traffic impediment or contribute to
aesthetic clutter. The physical characteristics of the news rack were
the source of 100% of the perceived harm. The content of the message
51. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 164-65 (2002) (observing that the protection of "residents' privacy" was among the
"important interests that the Village may seek to safeguard through some form of regu-
lation of solicitation activity").
52. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) ("The State's interest in protecting
the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a
free and civilized society").
53. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737.
54. Id. at 737.
55. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1233.
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inside the news racks had zero connection to that harm. Moreover,
commercial news racks were the least significant offenders, constitut-
ing the smallest percentage of racks, yet bearing the entire brunt of
the regulation. Commercial news racks constituted only three percent
of the offending physical objects, but bore 100% of the regulatory
burden.
In the case of telemarketing phone calls, however, the matter is
much more complex. The identity of a caller and the content of the
phone call do matter to people. Not all phone calls are created equal.
Some are more vexatious, irritating, and invasive than others. Con-
gress, the FTC, and the FCC are entitled to attack these problems
with a dose of realism.5 6 Do-Not-Call is not merely about the trill of
the phone and the hassle of getting up from the dinner table to con-
tend with a call. Congress and the enforcing agencies could quite jus-
tifiably conclude that for most Americans the sheer quantity of the
invasions was also a factor. Quantity alone can alter the nature and
order of the privacy invasion. 57 In Mainstream Marketing, the court
notes that without the protection afforded by Do-Not-Call,
telemarketers would be calling consumers who had already opted-in
approximately 6.85 billion times a year.
58
Moreover, political and charitable callers do not have a "free pass"
under the existing regime. They too may be barred by a consumer,
under the system of caller-specific blocking.59
56. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995).
57. See Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that "sheer quan-
tity" of calls generated by automatic dialing and announcing devices increases the inva-
sion of privacy).
58. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1240.
59. As the Tenth Circuit noted in its decision granting a stay of the District
Court's order:
[Blefore the FTC amended its Telemarketing Sales Rule, certain charitable or-
ganizations asked the agency not to include non-commercial callers in any do-
not-call list (neither a national do-not-call list nor a company-specific do-not-
call list). Although the FTC decided not to include charitable callers in a na-
tional do-not-call list, it was unwilling to exclude them from its company-spe-
cific do-not-call list if particular homeowners wanted to designate them
specifically. In this context, the FTC stated that charitable callers, in addition
to commercial callers, had an effect on homeowners' privacy, and thus should
not be completely immune from a consumer-initiated restriction. The FTC
stated that "the encroachment upon consumers' privacy rights by unwanted
solicitation calls is not exclusive to commercial telemarketers" and it therefore
concluded that some regulation was appropriate even in the non-commercial
context. 68 Fed. Reg. 4637. However, the FTC never found that commercial
and non-commercial callers affected homeowners' privacy interests to the same
degree. Rather, it emphasized "fundamental differences" between commercial
and charitable solicitation that make commercial callers more likely to "engage
in all the things that telemarketers are hated for." Id. Because of this distinc-
tion, the FTC found it appropriate to subject commercial telemarketers to the
national do-not-call Registry, but to regulate charitable callers only under the
less burdensome company-specific do-not-call rules. Id.
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Thus, in the case of Do-Not-Call, commercial telemarketers com-
prise the majority of telephone solicitations, and unlike Discovery Net-
work, do not in actuality bear the entire brunt of the regulation.
Political and charitable callers may be excluded, but such callers are
excluded on a more caller-specific basis. In the calculus of Central
Hudson, in short, the "fit" between the regulatory mechanism and the
governmental interest is much stronger for Do-Not-Call, and the ex-
treme "disconnect" in quantitative terms that existed in Discovery
Network does not exist.
The disruption caused by a bevy of multiple calls during quality
family time is undoubtedly an issue that matters to most people. In a
world in which commercial telemarketers are by percentage the worst
offenders, Congress and the two federal agencies could sensibly con-
clude that empowering consumers to block all commercial
telemarketers with one swoop, and to selectively block other specific
telemarketers as needed, would be the optimal adjustment of the com-
peting interests. 60 By concluding that telemarketers cannot turn to
the First Amendment in order to force unwelcome commercial speech
into the home, the court in Mainstream Marketing supported the con-
clusions of those federal bodies.
6 1
The "targeting blocking" aspects of Do-Not-Call dovetail well with
the fact that it is the consumer, not the government, making the ulti-
mate choice. This consumer empowerment is a favored device, not a
disfavored one, in terms of First Amendment values.6 2 Once again,
the analysis loops back to Rowan. Rowan heavily emphasized the ele-
ment of individual choice, and the "opt-in" feature of the mail blocking
system, a feature analytically identical to the opt-in feature of Do-Not-
Call.6
3
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Mainstream Mktg. Serv., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 854 n.5 (10th Cir.
2003) (Order of October 7, 2003 staying preliminary injunction of the District Court).
60. See Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 655-56 (8th Cir. 2003) (rul-
ing, in the context of faxes, that a bar on unsolicited commercial faxes in the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act was a reasonable fit with the substantial governmental inter-
est of reducing costs and intrusion, because commercial faxes could be properly classi-
fied as more intrusive than non-commercial faxes).
61. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1236.
62. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (ob-
serving that a system of consumer-initiated blocking is "less restrictive than banning,
and the Government cannot ban speech if targeted blocking is a feasible and effective
means of furthering its compelling interests").
63. The Supreme Court thus strongly endorsed the fact that the home dweller was
the "exclusive and final judge of what will cross his threshold." Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
See also Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 462-63 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying commer-
cial speech standards, the court held that in assessing what is or is not a "reasonable
fit," a resident-activated solicitation restriction was narrowly tailored and of the kind
"endorsed by the Supreme Court in Rowan"); Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 404 (7th
Cir. 1998) (striking down a regulation under the "reasonable fit" prong as paternalistic,
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IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT THE PARABLE TEACHES
Privacy and freedom of speech are often in tension in American
society. When these values are both implicated in a legal regulation,
the constitutional principles protecting the free flow of information
must at times be tempered to vindicate privacy interests that are also
of ancient vintage and vital importance.
64
because, unlike Rowan, "[hiere, the state, not the homeowner, has made the distinction
between real estate solicitations and other solicitations without a logical privacy-based
reason").
64. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
[Vol. 38760
